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DERRIDA’S CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL AND 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRESENCE 
David B. Allison* 
Now would be the time to reject 
the myths of inductivity and of the 
Wesenschau, which are transmitted, 
as points of honor, from generation 
to generation. ...Am I primitively 
the power to contemplate, a pure 
look which fixes the things in their 
temporal and local place and the 
essences in an invisible heaven; am 
 
I this ray of knowing that would have to 
arise from nowhere?
1 
SÍNTESE – O autor reexamina a crítica de Derrida
à fenomenologia de Husserl de forma a mostrar
como a sua coerência estrutural emerge não
tanto de uma redução a uma doutrina particular, 
mas antes das exigências de uma concepção 
unitária, especificamente impostas pelas deter-
minações epistemológicas e metafísicas da 
presença. 
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  ABSTRACT – The  author reexamines Derrida’s 
critique of Husserl’s phenomenology, so as to 
show how its structural coherency arises not so 
much from the reduction to a particular doctrine, 
but rather from the demands of a unitary concep-
tion, specifically from the demands imposed by 
the epistemological and metaphysical determina-
tions of presence. 
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It is practically a truism to say that most of Husserl’s commentators have in-
sisted on the rigorously systematic character of his writings. Despite the modifica-
tions that his “new beginnings” continually introduced, most critics sought to 
explain the formally coherent development of Husserl’s work by appealing to a 
principal theme or problematic. Usually, the purpose of these attempts was not so 
much to evoke a hidden architectonic of concepts as to stress a productive axis of 
investigation within the widely divergent subject matter of Husserl’s meditations. 
Most often, however, this approach resulted in the elevation of particular doc-
trines, each valued according to the interest of the respective scholar. Thus, 
Husserl’s task of truly philosophical thinking became transformed into what Eugen 
Fink has called a series of “symptoms,”
2 and the complete work was judged ac-
cording to Husserl’s so-called “doctrine” of the moment. Moreover, the number of 
historical “influences” to which his thought was claimed to have been indebted 
also assumed epidemic proportions. Critical access to Husserl’s thought, therefore, 
has focused upon the explicit themes or doctrines of cognition, the ego, intersub-
jectivity, ontology, constitution, logic, reduction, ideality, and embodiment – not 
to speak of Husserl’s Cartesianism, empiricism, or his indebtedness to Frege and 
Wundt. 
With the publication of Jacques Derrida’s La Voix et le phénomène,
3 however, 
Husserlian scholarship underwent a dramatic revision.
4 In that and several adjoin-
ing texts,
5 Derrida argued that the systematic development of Husserl’s phenome-
nology was best demonstrated not in terms of a particular problem, but by the 
examination of a certain prejudice – namely, the epistemological and metaphysical 
value of presence – a prejudice that guided the formulation of Husserl’s entire 
work.
6 Derrida contends that Husserl’s account of consciousness, subjectivity, 
objectivity, constitution, evidence, and logic implicitly or explicitly draw massively 
upon this unexamined prejudice. 
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For Derrida, the structural coherency of Husserlian phenomenology arises not 
from the reduction to a particular “doctrine”, but rather, from the demands of a 
unitary conception, specifically from the demands imposed by the epistemological 
and metaphysical determinations of presence. Precisely what this value of pres-
ence consists in, how it operates as an axiomatic prejudice within his philosophi-
cal system, and what the consequences it entails for Husserlian phenomenology 
are the subject matter of his general critique. 
Derrida argues three basic claims in Speech and Phenomena. The first is that 
temporal presence in fact serves as the underlying axiom in Husserl’s doctrine of 
signification – as set forth in his Logical Investigations, “Investigation 1: Expres-
sion and Meaning.”
7 Derrida’s second claim is that Husserl’s subsequent reflec-
tions on ideality, consciousness, and objectivity continually draw upon the “essen-
tial distinctions” that he established for signification in the First Logical Investiga-
tion. Hence, the necessity for Derrida’s stress upon this early text. Third, and more 
generally, Derrida maintains that the axiom of presence has in one way or another 
determined the various accounts of being, truth, and language, not only for 
Husserl and phenomenology, but for the broader tradition of Western philosophy 
as such. 
In choosing to begin with a critique of the Logical Investigations, Derrida has 
selected perhaps the most important, if not the most influential, of Husserl’s writ-
ings on language. Derrida’s interpretation is striking because he claims that the 
whole of phenomenololgy is implied in a reflection on language, that a discussion 
of meaning, expression, grammar, and logic – the themes of the Investigations – 
will anticipate and later decide the forthcoming “transcendental” problems. The 
value of focusing the analysis here lies in the fact that Husserl begins the Investi-
gations with a set of “essential distinctions,” a group of operative concepts that 
will rigorously and systematically guide his thought to the end. 
Derrida stresses the importance of these “essential distinctions,” not only be-
cause they dictate the course and structural unity of Husserl’s own work, but 
because they repeat, in an explicit and cogent way, the very axioms of traditional 
metaphysics. This is only one stage of the argument, however, for he does not 
mean to portray Husserl and phenomenology as merely another example in the 
history of metaphysics. Derrida will argue even more emphatically that Husserl’s 
thought is precisely the paradigm, the highest and final case, of this tradition. And 
it is ultimately the claims and pretensions of this tradition – the parameters of 
which are admittedly vast – that Derrida wants to contest. 
Derrida asserts that throughout his writings Husserl continually invokes the 
most conventional concepts of Western metaphysics to serve as the axiomatic 
foundation for phenomenology, and this is evident from the first “essential distinc-
tion.” By this procedure a certain decision is made to interpret the sense of being 
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in a particular way.
8 For Husserl and the tradition, Derrida argues, the sense of 
being has always been interpreted as presence, and this interpretation assumes 
two forms: something is insofar as it presents itself or is capable of presenting 
itself to a subject – as the present object (ob-jectum) of a sensible intuition, or as 
an objectivity presented to thought. Second, we say that a subject (sub-jectum), or 
self in general, is only insofar as it is self-present, present to itself in the immedi-
acy of a conscious act. The former sense marks the interpretation of being as 
objectivity (ousia, physis, etc.), the latter as subjectivity (parousia, nous, etc.). The 
interpretation of being as presence and self-presence
9 entails a series of philoso-
phical consequences and conceptual oppositions that persists to the present day, 
and nowhere are these consequences more strikingly evident than in the thought 
of Husserl. As part of his critical project of deconstruction,
10 Derrida discusses the 
                             
8   Derrida follows Heidegger’s distinction between (a) the sense of Being, (b) the word Being, and (c) 
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ence, Eng. tr., Kenley Royce Dove, New York: Harper & Row, 1970, pp. 27-28.) 
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  In response to a question posed by Jan Kott, Derrida remarks: “Here or there I have used the word 
déconstruction, which has nothing to do with destruction. That is to say, it is simply a question of 
(and this is a necessity of criticism in the classical sense of the word) being alert to the implica-
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discussion appears in The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man: the Structuralist Con-
troversy, ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1970), p. 271. 
  Derrida recognizes, nonetheless, that the system of Western thought is finite. It has a finite number 
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period of time as particular moments within this tradition, e.g., as particular schools or movements   93
genesis and derivation of this series as it functions in phenomenology. Among the 
many conceptual oppositions to be found there are those of matter (hyle) and form 
(eidos, idea), corporeal and incorporeal, body and soul, animate and inanimate, 
signifier and signified.
11 
Far from being “presuppositionless,” therefore, the interpretation of being as 
presence will provide phenomenology with its axial concepts. The highest princi-
ple of phenomenology, apodictic evidence, is precisely a call for the presentation 
or bringing forth (e-videre) of objects to an immediate and self-present intuition. 
The notion of transcendental consciousness, as well, is nothing more than the 
immediate self-presence of this waking life, the realm of what is primordially “my 
own.” By contrast, the concepts of empirical, worldly, corporeal, etc., stand op-
posed to this realm of self-present ownness. They constitute the sphere of other-
ness, the mediated, what is different from self-present conscious life, etc. All these 
concepts find their systematic unity in Husserl’s account of language. 
Language, for Husserl, serves scientific thought and finds its model in the 
highest degree of scientific objectivity, the form of logical predication. And, we 
should not forget, it is across and through language that meaningful statements 
can be recorded and transmitted, that a body of doctrine can be set down and 
verified, that a community of scientists can communicate, that science itself be-
comes possible. Meaningful language, consequently, has its own rules and pur-
pose; it is a “pure logical grammar,” and it expresses meanings in predicative 
form, i.e., in the form of a possible reference to an object. This is where Husserl 
makes the first “essential distinction” of the Logical Investigations. In language, 
there are two different sorts of signification: indication and expression. For 
Husserl, however, only one of these – expression – is meaningful. Expression alo-
ne, properly speaking, bears sense. 
It is important to understand why Derrida seizes upon this distinction. Mean-
ingful language is limited to expression. But how does expression differ from indi-
cation? Husserl understands indication to be a movement of empirical association. 
One sensible sign stands for something else: a mark, a note, an object makes us 
pass from something present to thought to something that is only anticipated or 
expected. There is no meaning content present in indication, there is only an 
empty signifier and nothing that is signified. That is yet to come, it is yet to be 
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presented. An expression, however, carries a meaning content with it. Meaning is 
present as the signified content of expression. What is perhaps more remote, but 
what for Husserl will ensure the very possibility of meaningful language, is its 
foundation upon an interpretation of being as presence. Derrida argues not only 
that this account of language and meaning is impossible, but that it is essentially 
contradictory, given the conceptual framework of the metaphysics of presence. 
For Husserl, the meaning content of expression is ideal. An expression is 
composed of an explicit, willed meaning intention that “animates” a nonsensible 
signifier, e.g., the “thought” or “imagined” word, the mere “form” of the actually 
uttered or written sign. In animating this purely formal signifier, the sign becomes 
invested with meaning, and meaning (Bedeutung) is ultimately the content of an 
interpretation (Deutung), while the sign or signifier in general is always a sign of or 
for something. Now, for Husserl, all these elements of expression are nonreal be-
cause they all take place within the immediacy of a self-present consciousness – 
what in the Logical Investigations he calls the sphere of “solitary mental life,” and 
what he will later call transcendental consciousness. 
The difficulty in such a conception – and Husserl realizes this – is that actual 
communication always involves an abandonment of this privileged sphere. It in-
volves the going-out into a world, into a realm of empirical fact. For this reason he 
maintains that expression is necessarily “interwoven” with indication in every 
case of effective communication. Husserl must preserve the distinction between 
the two kinds of sign, however, if he is to retain the ideal status of meaning, the 
possibility of a purely present and complete meaning. The original distinction is 
possible, in turn, only if expression can effectively take place within the purity of 
“solitary mental life.” Communication, then, would be a re-presentation of what 
primordially occurs in this inner sphere. What is “meant” in communication is 
merely “indicated” by means of sensible signs, by the actually spoken or written 
signs. The problem for Husserl lies in the relation between expression and indica-
tion. What is the nature of this “interweaving”? If there is to be pure expression at 
all – and, consequently, pure meaning – it must take place wholly within the in-
ternal sphere, independently of indication: it would be a “silent” monologue. 
There could be no meaningful communication per se in such a case, and following 
Husserl’s account, communication would come at the expense of meaning. But if 
indication were not merely “interwoven” with expression, if it were shown to be 
absolutely necessary to the very concept of expression, then the initial possibility 
of their distinction itself becomes suspect. And it is just this very distinction that 
Derrida contests, together with the terms it rests upon, i.e., “solitary mental life” 
and purely ideal, self-present meaning. 
Derrida first devotes a long critique to Husserl’s account of ideality. He insists 
that an ideal meaning is never a pure presentation to begin with; rather, it is al-
ready a re-presentation (Husserl uses the term Vorstellung) to consciousness, it is 
a product that is constituted across a series of discrete acts. What constitutes the 
ideality of meaning for Husserl is the possibility of its being repeated an infinite 
number of times. Clearly, this is never completed; its completion would demand   95
our disappearance as finite subjects. In any event, the ideal involves a relation of 
identity between acts, between a present act and an act that lies outside present 
consciousness. Moreover, the very form of the signifier, the sensory contour of a 
word or sign, is itself a constituted historical product. The signifier is neither acci-
dental nor idiomatic; it always reflects a definite linguistic origin and heritage. In 
addition, each occasion of its use represents (Repräsentation) only one instance of 
its many possible uses; each use selectively repeats a pre-existent convention. 
And what is it, finally, that really happens in this “interior monologue,” in this 
expression of “solitary mental life”? The expression is not a communication, for 
there is nothing to communicate: meaning is immediately self-present to the sub-
ject so there is no need to communicate. What kind of expression is this if there is 
no need to communicate anything to anyone? Husserl says this pure expression 
takes place entirely in the imagination. The interior monologue, then, is a phan-
tasy representation (Phantasievorstellung, Vergegenwärtigung). But Derrida re-
minds us that, for Husserl, the imagination can never be purely “neutral”; it is 
always the modification of an antecedent experience, and its positional character 
always testifies to an origin in empirical reality.
12 No matter how it is modified, 
reality becomes represented in the imagination. The imagination, and conse-
quently, the expressive monologue, is fraught with all those elements Husserl 
sought to exclude from it, all those empirical references which enter in under the 
various headings of repetition and representation. From the very start then, lan-
guage must be just this: a structure of repetition and representation. There can be 
no refuge from empirical determination in such a structure. 
Derrida’s critique entails two consequences for Husserl’s theory of language: 
there can be no purely “ideal” meaning, no pure presence of ideality, for at every 
moment ideality would have to depend on precisely what is nonpresent, what is 
only repeated and represented in another presence. There can be no sphere of 
pure self-presence either, for in the simplest act of signifying, “solitary mental life” 
would be fractured by all that lies outside it, namely, the world. Once this occurs, 
the distinction between indication and expression can no longer be maintained. 
There is no presence of self-presence for signification, there is only an endless 
series of reverberations. What “presents” itself in language is the representation of 
nonpresence, what Derrida calls “otherness,” “difference,” or “alterity.”
13 
                             
12   Speech and Phenomena, op. cit., p. 55. 
13   The theme of difference appears in many forms throughout Derrida’s extensive critique of Husserl. 
He argues that Husserl was too inattentive to the constitutive value of difference, i.e., of spatial, 
temporal, personal, and logical nonidentity. Most pointedly, Derrida focuses on the problems raised 
by difference with regard to Husserl’s distinction between inner and outer – transcendental and 
empirical – as well as the role of repetition and representation in the constitution of linguistic and 
ideal objectivities, and perhaps most tellingly, the problems raised by difference in Husserl’s under-
standing of temporality. Derrida goes on to discuss the concept of difference as it relates to the ar-
eas of semiotics, epistemology, and ontology, among others. Each of these uses finds its origin in 
the more primordial movement of what Derrida terms “differance” (with an a). Derrida derives this 
neologism from the French “différence.” As in the Latin “differre,” the French “différer” bears two 
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The distinction between indication and expression seems to be of question-
able worth, Derrida contends, once the important function of representation and 
repetition is made clear. But in carrying out the critical task of deconstruction, 
Derrida shows how Husserl’s whole theory of language is undermined by a still 
more fundamental problem – one that leads back to the phenomenological form of 
experience itself – the problem of time. Husserl claimed there was no need for 
communication in the “interior monologue” because, among other reasons, it took 
place in an “instant,” in the “blink of an eye.” Following this account, meaning 
would be immediately present in the self-same moment. There would be no need 
to mediate its presentation by means of indicative signs. There would be no tem-
poral distention in this process because signifier and signified are united in a 
punctual “now.” 
By Husserl’s own premises, however, such an argument must fail. His theory 
of time dictates against any “punctually isolated” moment, for time is a “phasing,” 
a continual movement of protentional and retentional traces. In The Phenomenol-
ogy of Internal Time-Consciousness,
14 Husserl argues that the present necessarily 
includes the phases of past and future under the heading of retention and proten-
tion. This conception of time denies the possiblity of a temporally isolated “mo-
ment” or “instant.” The very presence of the present is conditioned by what is 
absent or not yet realized. Far from being the point of origin for constitution, the 
“present” is itself constituted, produced, and derived from a more primordial 
source of nonpresence. Again, Derrida finds no arche of presence or self-presence. 
What he does find is a groundless play of differences that reflects an “outsided and 
beyond” of past and future.
15 
Derrida invokes the later account of temporality not merely to play upon an 
inconsistency within Husserl’s own thought, but rather to exhibit something far 
more important. In the Logical Investigations and elsewhere, the very concept of 
life had been understood as immediate self-presence, as the “living presence” of 
self-conscious thought. The historical importance of this concept cannot be over-
stated; it characterizes the modern thought of subjectivity since Descartes. 
Husserl, however, became increasingly skeptical of this view, as can be seen in 
his arguments against Brentano in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-
                             
variance, to be unlike, apart, dissimilar, distinct in nature or quality from something. This is even 
more evident in its cognate form, “to differentiate.” The other signification has a reference to tem-
porality, as in the English “to defer” – to put off action to a future time, to delay or postpone. While 
Derrida briefly explains this term in the first paragraph of Chapter 7 of Speech and Phenomena, he 
devotes an article of considerable length and importance to it somewhat later on, which is included 
as an appendix to the English translation of Speech and Phenomena, pp. 129-60. 
14   Edmund  Husserl,  Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, ed. Martin 
Heidegger (Halle: Niemeyer, 1929). The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, Eng. tr., 
James S. Churchill (Bloomington: The Indiana University Press, 1964). 
15   Speech and Phenomena, esp. pp. 82-87.   97
Consciousness, against Hume in Erste Philosophie,
16 and all throughout his later 
works, up to and including The Origin of Geometry. He came to see that if the 
present “now” were conceived as a punctual instant, there could be no coherent 
account of experience as such. One would paradoxically end in denying the iden-
tity of one’s own experience, one’s own self, as did Hume. There could be no self-
relation in such a case, and in short, there could be no life, understood as absolute 
subjectivity. 
Derrida concludes that the whole problem and history of language must be 
entirely rethought. Instead of trying to capture and retain a pure presence, we 
must conceive signification from the start as a movement away from self-
presence, a movement away from the pure presence of a discrete origin and the 
ideal presence of an identical meaning content.
17 As a movement of differance, 
signification precedes and gives rise to the very concepts of self, presence, and 
meaning. The proper account of signification begins not with the present and 
fulfilled meaning content, but with the sense that remains to be assembled and 
built up across the itinerary of convention and practice. Following the work of 
Ferdinand de Saussure, Derrida maintains that linguistic meaning is not so much 
the product of an explicit meaning intention as it is the arbitrary configuration of 
differences between signs. Meaning derives from the distance that extends be-
tween one particular sign and the system of other signs in linguistic use. It is this 
differential character of signs which must first be reckoned with, and this results 
from conventions existing within language – it is not a matter of meaning inten-
tions that supervene from without. There is no meaning, no signified content, that 
stands above and is free from this play of differences. Nor could meaning with-
stand the continuous shifting of differences, the continuous sedimenting of traces, 
as some ideal identity. For Derrida, there is only a likeness or sameness to mean-
ing, which is constituted across the history of ever-changing usage. Absolute 
objectivity, therefore, could never be claimed for meaning (yet for Husserl, the 
highest degree of objectivity is that of absolute ideality: the perfect identity of an 
omnitemporal meaning).
18 
What is striking in Derrida’s claim is the objection that linguistic meaning can 
never be completely present, either in itself or as the content of consciousness. 
There can never be an absolutely signified content, an absolutely identical or uni-
                             
16   Edmund Husserl, ERSTE PHILOSOPHIE (1923-24), Erster Teil: Kritische Ideengeschichte, ed. Rudolf 
Boehm (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956). This is to be found in Vol. VII of Husserliana, 
Gesammelte Werke. 
17   Derrida calls such a move, “decentering.” See Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the 
Discourses of the Human Sciences,” in The language of Criticism and the Sciences of Man, op. cit., 
pp. 247-72. This is also to be found in Writing and Difference, op. cit., pp. 278-93.  
18   Derrida presents a clear account of this in his essay, “White Mythololgy: Metaphor in the Text of 
Philosophy,” in Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 207-71. 
The argument draws extensively on Nietzsche’s early essay of 1873, “On Truth and Lie in a Non-
moral Sense.” See Friedrich Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Note-
books of the Early 1870’s, Eng. tr. and ed., Daniel Breazeale (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 
1979), pp. 79-97.   98
vocal meaning in language.
19 All these values are denied to meaning once we 
admit its dependence upon nonpresent elements. Meaning can never be isolated 
or held in abstraction from its context, e.g., its linguistic, semiotic, or historical 
context. Each such context is itself a system of reference, a system of signifiers, 
whose function and reality point beyond the present. What is signified in the pre-
sent, then, necessarily refers to the differentiating and nonpresent system of signi-
fiers in its very meaning. We can only assemble and recall the traces of what went 
before: we stand within language, not outside it. 
Starting out with the metaphor of “presence,” philosophy has generated a 
system of concepts whose import can be seen as essentially theological, what 
Heidegger has called the tradition of “onto-theo-logy.”
20 Ontology and theology are 
fundamentally united in their insistence upon a common ground and universal 
acount of being, a first cause and final reason to things. For the tradition of West-
ern metaphysics, this unity has always been asserted under the title of an absolute 
and nonempirical reality, a transcendent being or principle that would subtend the 
empirical order by virtue of its role as cause and form, arche or telos. What was 
traditionally held to invest the world with order and substance is ultimately some-
thing transcendent to that order: the Divine, the One, the principle of intelligibil-
ity, the unconditioned. 
Now it is precisely this kind of theololgical status that the concept of meaning 
– interpreted as ideality or absolute identity – has enjoyed in the history of West-
ern thought, and particularly when the account turns to problems of knowledge 
and signification. Despite the impurity of language and communication, the possi-
bility of an ideal and identical meaning has always been held out, whether as pure 
“form,” “eidos,” “idea,” “ideal,” or as absolute referent in the form of an ideal con-
tent of signification, what Derrida elsewhere calls a “transcendental signified.”
21 
Thus, for Husserl, what is “impure” in language is only the adjunction of “the 
sensory or so to speak bodily” aspect, i.e., the factually uttered phrase, the actu-
ally written complex. The “purity” of language, the very possibility of meaningful 
language, lies outside this sphere in the nonempirical or ideal sphere of meaning, 
in what can be purely “meant” or “intended” by language, in what can be “ex-
                             
19   Derrida’s argument thus denies one of Husserl’s main theses in the Logical Investigations (as well 
as in Formal and Transcendental Logic and “The Origin of Geometry”), i.e., that a critical theory of 
language can fix ideal and identical meanings as the foundation for strict scientific investigation. 
Like Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations and Zettel, Derrida argues strongly against the 
possibility of univocal meaning, a meaning that could endure the continual “shiftings of sense” and 
emerge as a permanent monument of context-free intelligibility. For Derrida, meaning is essentially 
“transposition,” “transfer,” “metaphor,” “decentering,” etc., and that it is always subject to a pre-
given semantic universe. 
20   For an account of this, see especially Martin Heidegger, “Die Onto-Theo-Logische Verfassung der 
Metaphysik,” in Identität und Differenz (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), Eng. tr., Joan Stambaugh, Identity 
and Difference (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), pp. 42-76. 
21   See Jacques Derrida, “Sémiologie et grammatologie: entretien avec Julia Kristeva,” in Positions 
(Paris: Ed. de Minuit, 1972), pp. 25-50. Eng. tr., Alan Bass, Positions (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 14-36. See also, Jacques Derrida, “Linguistics and Grammatology,” in Of 
Grammatology, Part I, ch. 3, pp. 27-73.   99
pressed” by language.
22 But Derrida’s reflection leads us to conclude that these 
distinctions can no longer be claimed for language for the precise reason that 
there can be no expression without indication, no signified without the signifier, no 
meaning or sense without the factually constituted complex of signifiers. To con-
clude that expression can never be “reduced” to an absolutely objective core of 
meaning, to conclude that meaning itself is no longer conceivable as a purely ideal 
presence, is also to conclude, for Derrida, that a certain period of metaphysical 
thought has come to a close. 
 
 
                             
22   In order to protect the pure presence of both solitary mental life and the signified meaning, a “me-
dium” of signification is required that would be free from all empirical resistance: a signifying “ele-
ment” is needed that would be absolutely nonempirical. Derrida demonstrates that, for Husserl, this 
“medium” or “element” is the voice (and however silent it may be, this internal monologue is still 
“spoken”), and this for two reasons: (1) the voice is the most “ideal” signifying medium in that it 
appears to be completely free of any empirical substance. (2) Only in speech does the signifier seem 
to be completely “reduced” to its signified content. The spoken word appears as a strangely dia-
phaneous and transparent medium for meaning. Because it animates a purely formal signifier (the 
“sensory contour” of the phoneme – not the actually uttered sound complex itself), the silent spee-
ch stands as a pure phenomenon – what Derrida terms “the phenomenological voice.” 
  The importance of the voice is not fortuitous with Husserl: implicitly or explicitly, the vocal medium 
has always functioned as the highest, the purest, form of signification. Its primacy is also that of re-
ason and thought. How this complicity operates for Husserl and the tradition is one of the major 
themes of Derrida’s general critique. For Derrida, however, the primacy of speech – which is ulti-
mately the primacy of presence – is illusory: it seems primary because it takes place “in an in-
stant,” in the apparent absence of the world. But in reality, speech is only possible because a cer-
tain kind of “writing” precedes it: namely, the invisible and unconscious inscription of signifying 
traces, the nonpresent and generative movement of differance that constitutes the system of lan-
guage itself. And it is precisely on this note that Derrida concludes his essay, “Linguistics and 
Grammatology”: [The] reference to the meaning of a signified thinkable and possible outside of all 
signifiers remains dependent upon the onto-theo-teleology that I have just evoked. It is thus the 
idea of the sign that must be deconstructed through a meditation upon writing which would 
merge, as it must, with the undoing [sollicitation] of onto-theo-logy, faithfully repeating it in its to-
tality and making it insecure in its most assured evidences. One is necessarily led to this from the 
moment that the trace affects the totality of the sign in both its faces. That the signified is originally 
and essentially... trace, that it is always already in the position of the signifier, is the apparently in-
nocent proposition within which the metaphysics of the logos, of presence and consciousness, 
must reflect upon writing as its death and its resource” (Of Grammatology, p. 73). 